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Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract: This essay aims to explore Foucault’s project of decentralizing
economics and to hint on some implications. It also makes a comparative
analysis between Foucault’s project and the projects similar to his design
and aim. I argue that Foucault’s critique of the idea of economics as a science
is stronger than that of the critiques which challenge the status of economics
as a science by exposing its deep fictional, literary or narrative content and
style. I argue that the strength of Foucault’s decentralization project lies in
the fact that he does not refer to the discursive content of economics in order
to demonstrate that it is not a science. Instead, he unveils its epistemological
conditions the character of which deeply haunts the sketch of economics as a
science. Foucault undertakes decentralization both at the formal and
historical level. At the formal level he shows that there are underlying
epistemological conditions that govern the formation of discourses including
economics in the West. At the historical level he demonstrates that there is
no trace of economics up to the eighteenth century in the West. This fact,
that economics is governed by modern Western epistemological conditions,
encourages me to question the aim of teaching economics in societies such as
Pakistan which are not part of the Western civilization.
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
In recent times several studies have been undertaken to explore the relationship
between philosophy and disciplines such as economics, history, literature,
psychology, mathematics and physics. The connection between philosophy andThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 149
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other disciplines deepens when the center, taking various forms such as
disembodied subject, transcendental reason, or laws of history, breaks apart in
the face of the discovery of desire, language, and the unconscious. In the
backdrop of the critique of the disembodied subject or reason the connection
between philosophy and economics is developed. Under these conditions the
status of economics as a science is challenged on many fronts. Among various
forms of decentralizing critiques one of the predominant forms focuses on the
discursive content of economics. It attempts to demonstrate that a substantial
part of economics, making up its theoretical and methodological framework, is
literary, fictional and storytelling which renders economics unscientific. This
form of critique is by and large informed by the linguistic turn.
Foucault’s decentralizing critique of economics is different and comparatively
stronger than the critiques challenging economics on the basis of its literary
form. Foucault’s decentralizing project of economics does not operate upon the
category of language. It is deeper and more profound than that of the project
working under the guidelines of the linguistic turn. Foucault traces the path of
the epistemological conditions lying beneath the linguistic turn to expose the
foundations of economics. The basic characteristic of epistemological conditions
seriously contests the status of economics as a science.
The important feature of Foucault’s decentralizing project is that it is not just
an abstract or formal one. Foucault also substantiates his thesis with historical
evidences that economics rests upon modern Western epistemological conditions.
He historically explores various issues surrounding exchange, value, wealth and
labor from the sixteenth, and up to the nineteenth, century to support his
decentralizing project. If economics rests upon modern Western epistemological
conditions it pushes us, Orientals, into an ironical situation: whether to
restructure our whole educational structure or to challenge Foucault’s
decentralizing project. This is an uncharted territory that needs to be explored.
My argument proceeds in the following steps. In the first section I will explore
Foucault’s project of decentralizing economics. In the second section a
comparative analysis is made between the project of Foucault and the projects
informed by the linguistic turn to point out the factors contributing to the
strength of Foucault’s project. In the third section, from the perspective of
decentralization, an attempt is made to show that there is no economics before
the eighteenth century. In correspondence with the third, the fourth sectionZulfiqar Ali 150
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argues that economics is not the product of the labor of reason but an effect of
the change that took place in the modern Western epistemological conditions. In
the end the argument is concluded with the comment on Foucault’s
decentralization project and its bearing upon Oriental society.
Formal decentralization: economics, not science Formal decentralization: economics, not science Formal decentralization: economics, not science Formal decentralization: economics, not science Formal decentralization: economics, not science
There are certain epistemological rules which define what science is. Various
methodologies in science are informed by one of these rules. These rules define
the truth conditions of scientific statements. According to Eichner, all scientific
statements are subject to the tests of coherence, corresponding, comprehensive
and parsimony (Eichner, 1983, pp. 507-509). All these tests are empirical,
excluding the test of coherence that measures the logical - formal and informal -
connection among statements. I will not go into the details of tests. In brief, by
the correspondence test we judge whether the conclusions drawn upon in a
theory are empirically verifiable or not. The comprehensive test makes sure that
all relevant data, theoretical assumptions and facts are taken into account in the
construction and verification of theory. The parsimony test, in contrast to the
comprehensive, aims to sort out such assumptions and collection of data in the
given theory that are not necessary but wrongly taken to be a part of the theory.
These tests aim to discover the truth about the objects that lie in the world
independent of subjectivity. They not only presuppose the category of objective
truth but also consider scientific methodology the only tool to discover it.
To Foucault, economics cannot be a science. This is not because economics as
theory is not developed in accordance with tests, nor because the literary form
has deeply penetrated its theoretical and methodological literature. Even if it
completely follows the tests of correspondence, coherence, comprehension and
parsimony, which is also a remote possibility, it cannot be a science. To
Foucault, determining the status of economics as a science does not lie in
judging whether it follows or fails to confirm the tests. Foucault may not reject
the possibility that economics may follow them. The charge of Foucault against
the idea that economics is a science is that the epistemological conditions that
are neither scientific nor non-scientific preclude such discourse. These
epistemological conditions, which are in themselves not subject to the rules of
coherence, correspondence, comprehensive and parsimony, set up the framework
in which some investigations turn up as scientific and unscientific. FoucaultThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 151
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argues that scientific methodology and its assumptions and the controversy
surrounding the status of economics as a science are the by-product of modern
epistemological conditions. Foucault argues that controversies at the surface are
governed by underlying epistemological conditions, what he calls episteme,
which is sensitive to time and space. These epistemological conditions are a
priori in the sense that experience and understanding in a given period
necessarily presuppose them.
In recent Western history Foucault discovers that three fundamental changes
took place at the epistemological foundations of Western civilization. The first
change occurred during the sixteenth century when Resemblance providing
epistemological foundations to Renaissance thought is replaced by
Representation. From the sixteenth, up to the eighteenth century,
Representation governs the thought of the Classical period. The Classical period
did not give birth to the controversy surrounding the status of economics because
there was no economics before the eighteenth century. According to Foucault, in
the face of the fall of classical episteme modern thought vacillates from
formalism to hermeneutics. When modern thought is haunted by the discovery
that language precludes human experience and understanding it either attempts
to formalize or scienticize and mystifies or hermeneuticize everything, of which
reducing economics to a science is one of the instances.
Foucault historicizes the discourse in which economics is either demonstrated as
science or fiction. He states that “In fact, it is a matter of two correlative
techniques whose common ground of possibility is formed by the being of
language, as it was constituted on the threshold of the modern age. The critical
elevation of language, which was a compensation for its subsidence within the
object, implied that it had been brought nearer both to an act of knowing, pure
of all words, and to the unconscious element in our discourse. It had to be either
made transparent to the forms of knowledge (attempt to reduce economics to
science), or thrust down into the contents of the unconscious (attempt to reduce
economics to fiction or conjecture). This certainly explains the nineteenth
century’s double advance, on the one hand towards formalism in thought and on
the other towards the discovery of the unconscious - towards Russell and Freud.”
(Foucault, 1994, p. 298) Foucault makes an important point when he classifies
such attempts which reduce economics either to a science or conjecture as two
correlative techniques or double advance. He argues that both attempts rest uponZulfiqar Ali 152
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modern epistemological conditions that tore apart modern thought into two
opposite schools of thought.
Foucault’s critique of the idea of economics as a science does not rest upon the
modern parameters of thinking. His characterization of epistemological
conditions providing framework to determine what is and what is not scientific
indicates that the there is no universal form of reason operating on
transcendental or universal categorizations such as universal rules given by
Eichner. So something is rational or scientific or true may turn up as
irrational, unscientific and false, in another period. This is not because the one
period gains maturity in reasoning and critical analysis. For Foucault, the
change of truths does not indicate maturity but reflects a change at the
structural foundation of knowledge.
The epistemological conditions are neither external nor internal to the discourse
of economics. They are part of the discourse yet they remain allusive to it. They
can be qualified as prediscursive as long as one admits that this prediscursive is
still discursive, “that is, that they do not specify a thought or a consciousness, or
a group of representation which is a posteriori… but they characterize certain
levels of discourse” (Ibid., p. 76). As the epistemological conditions are
prediscursive they form the positive unconsciousness of Western discourse.
Reason which labels something scientific and unscientific operates upon this
positive unconsciousness. There is no point at which reason can take hold of this
positive unconsciousness. It can neither transcend nor bracket it. All discourses
including economics operate upon a so-called unconsciousness. So Foucault
seriously contests the claim that economics is a science. To Foucault, economics
can never be transparent to its foundation. Adding further, he argues that we
must not engage in an attempt to give a rational foundation to unconsciousness.
This is because the rational foundation cannot be provided to the foundation of
discourses. It does not mean that discourses including economics are irrational.
To Foucault, the foundation that makes what is rational and what is not, is
positive unconsciousness. This positive unconsciousness which is the
epistemological condition of discourses provides foundation to economics.
Discourses cannot provide a rational foundation to unconsciousness since they
are themselves grounded upon it.The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 153
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critique of economics critique of economics critique of economics critique of economics critique of economics
In recent times several important studies have been developed in connection
between philosophy and economics. Particularly, in the aftermath of the
so-called “linguistic turn”, philosophy has radically altered the discourse of
economics by exposing the literary form inherent in economic theories. The
notable examples challenging the construction of economics as science are the
works of Klamer et al. (1988), Henderson (1995), Weintraub (1991), McCloskey
(1983), Samuels (1990), Ziliak and McCloskey (2008). Klamer (2001), in an
attempt to make sense of economics, narrates his painful journey from initially
viewing economics as science to rhetoric and beyond. Henderson considers
economic writings much similar to literary writings. McCloskey considers
disputes among economists based more upon rhetoric than upon theories.
Weintraub treats economic models as narratives. These models heavily rely upon
the forms of story-telling.
In this regard Turk spotlights the role of story such as Robinson Crusoe in the
explanation of economic practices. He gives the example of Quesnay’s reliance
upon the abstract principles, Smith’s pin factory and Diderot’s imaginations to
establish economics as a plausible conjecture. The place of stories in the
economic explanation clearly demonstrates the reliance of economics upon
narratives as commonplace. But Turk taking a moderate position neither reduces
economics to literature nor to pure science. However he broadens the scope of the
critique of the idea of economics as science (Turk, 2002, pp. 21-46). He shows
that economics is working along somewhat fluid boundaries between fact and
fiction in which both fictions and narratives explain the economic facts. Because
of permanent tendency of economics to vacillate from fact to fiction Turk
characterizes economics as a plausible conjecture. All the above critiques are
informed by the linguistic turn. The major flaw of such critiques is its absolute
reliance upon language as narrative. The critique does not go beneath language
to expose what happened at the foundations of knowledge that brought language
to the surface to explain economic models. This form of critique is extremely
limited in its scope and nature. Foucault argues that, the “linguistic turn” is just
an effect of the change that took place at the foundations of the Western
knowledge. That is why I consider Foucault’s attempt to decentralize economics
much stronger than that of the critique informed by the linguistic turn. TheZulfiqar Ali 154
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strength of Foucault’s critique is its tracing the path that leads to the
underlying semiotic principles giving birth to the linguistic turn. Foucault
argues that the change at the foundations of knowledge (episteme) brings about
many important epistemological events, one among which is the linguistic turn.
So the critique informed by the linguistic turn challenging the notion of
economics as science is superficial. It is superficial because it targets the claim
of economics as a science on the idea that economics substantially appeals to
story telling or fiction to explain economic models and affairs. To Foucault this
specific form of critique itself rests upon modern epistemological conditions.
The second factor that contributes to the strength of Foucault’s decentralizing
critique of economics is its insistence on the idea that the critique informed by
the linguistic turn would not be successful. That is to say, the attempt to reduce
either economics to science or to literature will not be convincing. This is
because of the inherent radical nature of modern epistemological conditions.
Foucault discusses the extreme nature of modern conditions in terms of “Man
and His Doubles”: The empirical and transcendental, the cogito and the
unthought, the retreat and return of the origin are the doubles to which Man is
reduced. The crux of the discussion of Man and his Doubles is to show that
modern thought is torn into extremes of either thought (science) or unthought
(literature), origin (reason) or retreat (desire), transcendental(universal) or
empirical (particular). Presupposing Man has both transcendental and
empirical, thought and unthought, origin and retreat sides of which one side
cannot be reduced to the other Foucault proclaims the death of Man. That is to
say that the modern thought cannot resolve the issue of the transcendental, the
cogito and of the origin by reducing Man to the empirical, the unthought and
the retreat and vise a versa. In the context of present controversy we cannot
resolve the issue of economics if it is extremely reduced to science or literature.
In this regard Foucault gestures that the Western thought after the death of
Man tends to conceive man in terms of both transcendental and empirical at the
same time. It tends not to reduce transcendental to empirical but to consider
both transcendental and empirical parts equally. The critique of economics
either as science or conjecture cannot be successful as long as it reduces Man to
thought/transcendental/origin or to unthought/empirical/retreat.The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 155
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Foucault may seriously contest the claim of economics as a science and establish
his own argument that economics presupposes modern epistemological conditions
if he historically shows that there is no economics before the modern period. It
would further strengthen his project of decentralization of economics drawn
upon epistemological foundations, not upon discursive content of economics. In
the context of decentralization Foucault argues that economics is born at the
end of the eighteenth century in the Western civilization. Before the eighteenth
century there was no economics, yet there were discussions and debates about the
exchange, money, wealth and value. For Foucault, these discussions cannot be
qualified as economics despite notable similarities existing among the discourses
of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The similarities, or what Foucault
calls ‘unity’, among discourses of different periods are the traps that are to be
avoided. On the surface there are apparent unities among discourses of distinct
periods in terms of ‘object’, ‘enunciation’, ‘concept’, ‘theme’ and ‘strategy’. For
example, wealth as an object, the law of supply and demand as a concept,
scarcity as a theme, and management as a strategy provides many historians of
economics with a ground to conclude that the discourse of economics is far more
primitive than the eighteenth century. For Foucault, the concept of wealth in
the seventeenth century of the Western civilization was not similar to the
concept of wealth discussed in the modern discourse of economics. Neither is the
law of supply and demand, nor is the theme of scarcity common, yet the
discourses developed during the seventeenth century are preoccupied with the
issue of supply and demand and of scarcity as well. For Foucault, this similarity
has no more than a nominal significance. It exists merely on the plain of
language.
In view of Foucault, the distinct and conflicting views about object, concept,
theme and strategy do not constitute the formation of discourse. For, there is no
same object, concept, strategy and theme across different periods of Western
history. One of the grievous errors committed by modern day historians of
economics is their attempt to trace the history of economics from Greeks to
Enlightenment. Robbins’ attempt (2000) is an example among many. In the first
lecture in London School of Economics Robbins gives great weight to the
historical development of economics for the understanding of the contemporaryZulfiqar Ali 156
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economic issues. He claims that history of economics matters on formative basis
for the understanding of economic issues, whereas the history of natural science
is not necessary for the understanding of contemporary issues concerning biology
or physics. The notions such as exchange, pricing, allocation and control of
resources provide him with ground to trace the history of economics from the
times of Plato.
In this context Essid claims that “from the standpoint of discursive training
Greek thought enabled Arab-Muslims thinkers to rationalize their economic
discourse…and to rethink economic behavior” (Essid, 1995, p. 231). But when
such notions providing unity to different discourses scattered around distinct
periods of history are suspended, the formation of discourse definitely shows a
series of full gaps, exposes different concepts with different rules and appearance
of incompatible themes (Foucault, 1972, p. 37). The objects, concepts, themes and
strategies seem too heterogeneous before the eighteenth century to be linked
together and arranged in a single figure of economics. However, Foucault argues
that in the classical period different themes, concepts and strategies can
consistently be arranged in the figure of what he calls analysis of wealth. The
analysis of wealth cannot be qualified as economics. This is because the
epistemological conditions of the classical discourse are different from that of
modern. Foucault refutes the projection of economics as science which is
developed and matured by various historical stages; to him, economics does not
presuppose progressive historical stages.
Historical decentralization: birth of economics Historical decentralization: birth of economics Historical decentralization: birth of economics Historical decentralization: birth of economics Historical decentralization: birth of economics
From the standpoint of decentralization Foucault argues that the object,
enunciation, concept, strategy and theme are not and can never be the same
across historical periods. The fundamental reason that Foucault offers for the
non-substantial or decentralized status of object, concept, theme and strategy is
that the discourse forms its own object and concepts. He may have sympathy with
Althusser (2005), Aglietta (2000), Tribe and Kadish (2001), Hindess (2001),
Hirst (2005), Hassan (2000), Cutler (1977), Wolff et al. (2001) and McCloskey
(1983), all participating in the project of decentralizing economics.
Foucault argues that there is no wealth as an object of discourse existing prior
to the discursive formation. It is the discourse that constitutes the object,
concept, theme and strategies. He writes that wealth is “constituted by all thatThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 157
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was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained
it, traced its development, indicated its various correlation, judged it, and
possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were taken to
be its own” (Foucault, 1994, p. 32). Situating wealth within discourse shows the
height of Foucault’s decentralization project of economics. The severity of
decentralization further deepens when Foucault argues that as soon as discourse
forms wealth as an object of study it forms the subject who understands and
explains it. The discourse of economics not only creates money but also an
economist who understands and explains its circulation and concentration.
There is no synthesizing or unifying function of a subject through which
various monetary statements become possible (Ibid., p. 55).
The economist does not hold a transcendental position outside the discourse of
economics. He is formed within the discourse. This claim can best be verified
outside the Western region. This is because, if the economist is formed within
discourse, the outside world even if it is radically different must have no
bearings upon the formation of the economist. This can be established if the
discourse produces much like the same economists throughout the world. I take
the site of Pakistan to evaluate the strength or weakness of Foucault’s thesis.
Pakistan being a part of oriental tradition is different at the formative basis
from Western societies. Because of the British colonial legacy economics as a
subject is introduced in the curriculum of universities and colleges from the very
first day of her independence, 14th August, 1947. Discourse has its Western
origin though it is introduced in a non-Western region. If economics constructs
the economist in Pakistan much like it fabricates it in the West, it would
establish that economist born within the discourse. In Pakistan, after twelve
years of education, the student is admitted to the university or a higher
educational institute. He is supposed to complete his/her BS (Bachelor of
Studies) in economics within four years of studying and MS (Master of Studies)
in two years with thesis. In a period of four to six years the student is taught
about 48 to 56 courses of which most are specialized courses. The courses are
almost the same in content to the courses taught in Western universities and
institutes. [1] We are by and large trained in Western economics.
However, the outside world is non Western. Rationality sets aside the cultural
content informed by oriental and religious traditions. This fact further
strengthens Foucault’s thesis that subject, economist, forms within discourse.
The object forms on what Foucault calls the “surfaces of their emergency” and byZulfiqar Ali 158
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the grids of specification and “authorities of delimitation” (Foucault, 1972,
p. 41). Surfaces of emergency signify institutions and cultural world in which
the object is initially formed with mundane recognition. Regarding wealth, the
surface of emergence during the seventeenth century comprises of various
practices relating to bank customs, trade practices, and commerce, etc. (Ibid., p.
168). And the authorities of delimitations and the grids specification were, for
example, the states, mercantile institutions, Law’s experiment and its
liquidation etc (Foucault, 1994, p. 168). Foucault makes it further clear that
these factors in themselves cannot form the units of discourse until a certain
form of discursive relations is not at work among them. The relations uniting
different factors and forces to form a discourse are called discursive relations
(Foucault, 1972, p. 45). They provide an epistemological foundation to the
discourse. He writes that “a money reform, a banking custom, a trade practice
can all be rationalized, can all develop, maintain themselves or disappear
according to appropriate forms; they are all based upon a certain ground of
knowledge.” (Foucault, 2000, p. 255). If discursive relations are at work the
subject and object can only have discursive existence. By discursive existence I
mean that something exists by virtue of discourse. I would like to make it clear
that, for Foucault, discourse does not exist in advance of subject and object. The
discursive formation is the formation of subject, object, concept, theme and
strategy. There is no established discourse in advance that constitutes its units.
According to Foucault, the sixteenth century’s economic thought is almost
restricted to the problem of prices and that of the best monetary substance
(Foucault, 1994, p. 168). There are apparently two parallel schools of thought:
physiocrates and utilitarians. Foucault claims that the thought of the
physiocrates and of the utilitarians, despite their opposition, is grounded upon
the same epistemological foundations. The fundamental similarity lies in their
conception of the origin of value. The physiocrates and the utilitarians equally
consider nature as a source of value, however for the physiocrates the
superabundance of nature and its insufficiency for the utilitarian is the sources
value (Gutting, 1995, p. 172).
Money is the common measure between commodities and is a substitute in the
mechanism of exchange (Ibid., p. 169). When the origin of value is explained
either in terms of excess or insufficiency, money cannot have intrinsic value. The
fundamental function of money as a sign is to represent the value of things. So it
has value by virtue of its operation i.e. exchange (Ibid., p. 172). Money isThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 159
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representation of value per se. Money as a representation per se constituting ‘the
analysis of wealth’ is one of the effects of a broader epistemological condition of
the Western discourse during the seventeenth century.
According to Foucault, there is no more than one specific epistemological
condition at a given historical period (Foucault, 1994, p. 168). During the
classical period it is the representation that orders the formation of discourse.
Foucault elaborates that the signifying element “can become a sign only on
condition that it manifests, in addition, the relation that links it to what it
signifies. It must represent but that representation, in turn, must also be
represented within it.” (Ibid., p. 64) The sign becomes double. It is the
representation as well as the representation is itself represented. A map or
picture as a sign can be taken as an example to elaborate the properties of the
sign. By consequence of binary organization of the sign, money, like a map, has
no value in its own right. It has value because it represents the value of things.
But when one looks at the conception of money before the sixteenth century, the
Renaissance era, one finds out a different concept of money. In the Renaissance
era money has value in its own right. Neither land nor labor determines the
value of money. For, the discourse, up to the end of the sixteenth century, is
conditioned by a different epistemological condition i.e. resemblance (Ibid., p.
17). In the Renaissance age everything is linked with another in terms of
resemblance. So the world is linked together like a chain (Ibid., p. 18). Money as
a sign holding all properties of the valued object has value in its own right.
So there is an underlying semiotic code that governs the formation and
development of the Western discourse. In this context Mark Bevir highlights the
strengths and weaknesses of Foucault’s analysis from the perspective of a modest
humanist (Bevir, 2002, pp. 119-138). For Bevir, the strength of Foucault’s
archaeological analysis of the Western sciences is its acceptance that there are
no pure facts and reason. Bevir repeatedly emphasizes that Foucault is
absolutely right to insist that there are neither pure facts nor autonomous
individuals. But, for Bevir, Foucault is wrong on three accounts. First, he is
wrong to claim that our understanding of the world is the sole product of a
semiotic code. Second, Foucault is wrong to say that there are so radical
discontinuities in the formation of knowledge that they deny the possibility of a
comparative analysis of rival theories belonging to distinct periods. Third,
Foucault is also wrong to insist that the individual is one of elements within a
discursive formation.Zulfiqar Ali 160
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I will briefly argue that Bevir’s critique of Foucault is misplaced. Bevir claims
that the concepts including the concept of episteme arose out of individual’s
attempts to comprehend the world. The individuals assess the weaknesses and
strengths of rival theories to attain a reasonable knowledge of the outer world.
They can act freely and develop in ways that are neither fixed nor limited by the
social context. However, individuals make choices and attain knowledge against
the background of the social context. I think that these evidences do not call the
notion of episteme into question. For, all these evidences derive from the
contemporary Western epistemological conditions. Bevir draws his argument
upon the epistemological foundation that is the product of the fall of the modern
episteme which is indicated by Foucault. Bevir’s attempt to show that the
individual in part is free (transcendental) and informed by the social context
(empirical) does not challenge the notion of episteme but strengthens it. I have
discussed earlier that Foucault proclaims the death of modern epistemological
conditions and emphasizes the need to understand Man both as transcendental
and empirical. Bevir draws his argument upon the plane constituted by the death
of Man as predicted by Foucault.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a new conception of money and
value comes to the surface. The change in the conception of money and value
indicates the fall of the classical epistemological foundation, not the maturity of
reason. From Kant onward the fundamental question concerning the Western
discourse is to understand the ironical relationship between transcendental and
empirical in relation to man. That is to understand man’s finitude in terms of
determinism and the influence exerted by various historical and cultural forces
upon man, such as organic, economic and linguistic. Foucault characterizes the
attempts to understand the finitude of man as ‘analytic of finitude’. He discusses
the works of Kant, Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo in the contest of analytic
of finitude. According to Foucault, in the classical age, scarcity is understood in
relation to human needs. But Ricardo onwards, it is not need but land’s
insufficiency which creates needs and scarcity. The insufficient resources of land
constitute the finitude of man. Both Ricardo and Malthus consider human labor
to be the only means of overcoming or at least evading the imminence of death
(Ibid., p. 256). And one more fundamental change takes place in the discourse of
economics after the collapse of representation. The origin of value is no longer
the excess or insufficiency of land. Instead, labor imparts value. It is not Adam
Smith but Ricardo who absolutely breaks away from the discourse of analysis of
wealth. In Smith’s analysis, although labor owes the privileged position SmithThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 161
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considers the exchange, not labor, as a measure to determine the value of things.
For Smith, the constant fluctuation of labor in comparison to commodities keeps
the principle of labor not viable to determine the value of things. That is why
Foucault considers Adam Smith as a classical, not a modern, thinker because he
still thinks in terms of representation.
By contrast Ricardo makes a radical break with representation and so also with
Adam Smith. Ricardo considers labor, nothing but labor, as a source of value.
Labor is worker’s activity, toil and time to produce things. For Adam Smith,
according to Foucault, labor is analyzable into hours and days which can be
used as units common to all other merchandize commodities. For Ricardo, a
thing has value not because it is representable in units of work; instead labor
imparts all value to it (Foucault, 1994, p. 254). So “value can no longer be
defined, as in the Classical age, on the basis of a total system of equivalences,
and of the capacity that commodities have of representing one another. Value
has ceased to be a sign, it has become a product.” (Ibid., p. 254)
Amariglio (Amariglio, 1988) characterizes the change from the classical to the
modern episteme as the displacement of the primacy of desire and need by the
category of labor. The modern episteme inaugurates labor. Foucault’s sole
emphasis upon labor as the fundamental category derived from the modern
epistemological conditions pushes Lawrence Birken to conclude that Foucault
ignores the Marginalist revolution. Birken considers overlooking Marginalist’s
contribution as a fundamental flaw resulting from the larger methodological
patterns (Birken, 1990). For him, the fundamental flaw of the Foucauldian
methodology is its failure to give an explicit criterion to determine where these
epistemes begin or end. That is why Foucault ignores Marginalism that
challenges the category of labor in favor of desire. In reply to Birken’s objection
Amariglio (Birken, 1990) defends the position of Foucault. Marginalism derives
from the category of Man following modern epistemological conditions. The
introduction of the notion of desire and needs as source of value does not reverses
the modern episteme.
Labor as a sole source of value has consequences. The first is the birth of a new
conception of causality. In the classical period the rise and fall of production
and of prices used to be explained in terms of the factors that represented prices.
The prices increased when the representing element increased faster than the
elements they represented. So it was always a question of circular and surfaceZulfiqar Ali 162
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causality. But when labor is conceived as a sole source of value it forms a
radically new form of causality i.e. linear and homogeneous series. Everything
including cost, production, consumption, exchange, manufacturing, wages,
capital, income etc., is determined by the quantity of labor. The linear series
introduces a possibility of a continuous historical time or the total suspension of
history. It is the first time, economics is articulated upon history in the sense
that the value is considered in relation to the conditions of production, and the
conditions in question are determined by the quantity of labor. In this context
Foucault explains the works of Marx. For Foucault, it is the modern episteme
providing Marx with the epistemological foundation to construct history in
materialist terms.
The second consequence is the birth of economics in the anthropological hollow.
Because of the insufficiency of land and increasing population man had to
either face death or to overcome scarcity by an unending process of intensive
labor. The perpetual and fundamental situation of scarcity makes economics
possible (Foucault, 1994, p. 256). So, economics refers to that order of somewhat
ambiguous considerations which may be termed anthropological. Anthropology
not only refers to the biological properties of human beings, but to the situation
when human beings run the risk of life in the face of having no means and refers
to the labor as a sole source of overcoming scarcity, death and extinction (Ibid.,
p. 257). It gives birth to a new conception of man as Homo economicus. “Homo
economicus is not the human being who represents his own needs to himself, and
the objects capable of satisfying them; he is the human being who spends, wears
out, and wastes his life in evading the imminence of death. He is a finite being.”
(Ibid., p. 257)
Homo economicus gives birth to economics in the anthropological hollow.
Finitude or death constitutes economics; the fundamental concern of modern
economics is to overcome omnipresent threat. In this connection Deleuze
elaborates further that death under capitalism becomes more pervasive than
under previous systems. Finitude is not fundamentally constituted by the lack of
resources but insufficient money to secure food and shelter. Death becomes
immanent to everyday existence – the omnipresent threat, that is, of losing one‘s
job, and so losing market access to the means of life (Deleuze and Guattari,
2003, p. 232; Holland, 2001, p.85).
The fact that economics is the consequence or the logical corollary of
considering labor as the sole source of value leads us to one important aspect ofThe Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 163
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economics. From the perspective of Foucault economics is neither a pure
accident, nor by chance have we invented it. It presupposes somewhat the
structure of which it is a result. Chaos has not invented economics. However
structure rests upon positive unconsciousness. Under different conditions
Guattari et al. emphasize the same point: “Everything is rational in capitalism,
except capital or capitalism itself. The stock market is certainly rational; one
can understand it, study it, capitalists know how to use it, and yet it is
completely delirious, it is mad. That’s why we say: the rational always is the
rationality of an irrational. Marx is fascinated by capitalist mechanisms
precisely because the system is demented, yet works very well at the same time.
Down below, there are investments of desire that cannot be confused with the
investments of interest: all kinds of libidinous-unconscious flows that make up
the delirium of this society. The true history is the history of desire.” (Guattari
et al., 2008, p.36)
It is well known that Foucault is primarily concerned with the development of
thought and governing practices from the Ancient Greeks up to the nineteenth
century. In most of his career he remained silent on the modern developments
such as neo-liberalism. But in the late 1970s at the Collège de France he
delivered a series of lectures published as The Birth of Biopolitics in which he
once again takes up the notion of homo economicus in relation to the modern
developments such as liberalism and neoliberalism. In these lectures Foucault
traces the birth of liberalism and neoliberalism in relation to homo economicus.
The principal line of demarcation between liberalism and neoliberalism is that
the former understands society on the principle of exchange and latter on
competition (Read, 2009). But both equally share that the market manifesting
the essence of human beings provides a legitimate ground to understand all
possible human relations. The crux of Foucault’s lectures is that a particular
form of subjectivity produces certain political ideologies that involve different
governing apparatuses which at the same time represses many. The issue of
repression becomes severe when economics operating upon modern Western
epistemological conditions intrudes into the non-Western region which is
radically different. Faced with no studies on the repression of oriental society I
can only speculate its effects and dimensions.Zulfiqar Ali 164
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Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
The birth of economics at the end of the eighteenth century decentralizes
economics. It demonstrates that economics is not the result of the labor of
reason. Instead, it is an effect resulting from shift in underlying epistemological
conditions. The epistemological conditions, providing the framework to
understand what is scientific and what is not, in themselves are not subject to
the tests of correspondence, coherence, comprehensive and parsimony. From the
perspective of the foundation of economics it rests upon such a form of
unconsciousness which can never be rationalized. Economics at its foundation
cannot be a science. Unconsciousness always precludes economics’ attempts to
scienticize itself. This aspect of critique strengthens Foucault’s decentralization
project in comparison to the critique challenging economics on the grounds of
its deep orientation towards fiction, story telling and literary style and content.
Foucault’s discovery of unconsciousness may disturb us, Orientals. We
introduced economics in our universities and colleges with the belief that it is a
science, or at least that it is organized and formed around universal rational
principles. We hoped that discourses are not inherently racial or regional in
nature. Foucault breaks apart our beliefs and hopes furnished by colonization.
Foucault’s critique has brought us to a dead end. We are training our fourth
generation in Western discourses such as economics but the question is to what
end? In spite of this fact we have to proceed. In the face of Foucault’s discovery
the best possible options are either to seriously contest Foucault’s argument or to
thoroughly restructure our educational institutions and curriculum.
Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes
[1] A short list of courses is as follows: Fundamentals of Economics, Principles
of Macro and Micro Economics, Monetary and Mathematical Economics, Micro
and Macro Economic Theory, Econometrics, Market, Institutions and Economic
Growth, Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Economic History, Econometrics,
Methods and Applications, Finance, Public Policy, Industrial and Agricultural
Economics, Management. (http://www.econdse.org/program-frame.htm,
http://www.uok.edu.pk/faculties/economics/bseco.php, http://www.hec.gov.pk/
InsideHEC/.../Curriculum Revision/.../Economics%202008.pdf)The Journal of Philosophical Economics V:1 (2011) 165
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